Does Cohabitation Matter? : French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government

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2009
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West European Politics ; 32 (2009), 6. - pp. 1140-1160. - ISSN 0140-2382. - eISSN 1743-9655
Abstract
This article analyses French European policy-making in the context of divided government, arguing that in the area of European policy-making cohabitation increases the number of veto players, as compared with unified government. The increase of veto players, in turn, reduces France's acceptance-sets at the European table and thereby introduces a status quo bias. In order to test this theory, use is made of a comparative case study design. Process-tracing and counterfactual analyses reveal that veto player theory can, indeed, be applied to the interactions of a split-executive government.
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320 Politics
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ISO 690LEUFFEN, Dirk, 2009. Does Cohabitation Matter? : French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government. In: West European Politics. 32(6), pp. 1140-1160. ISSN 0140-2382. eISSN 1743-9655. Available under: doi: 10.1080/01402380903230603
BibTex
@article{Leuffen2009Cohab-37639,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1080/01402380903230603},
  title={Does Cohabitation Matter? : French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government},
  number={6},
  volume={32},
  issn={0140-2382},
  journal={West European Politics},
  pages={1140--1160},
  author={Leuffen, Dirk}
}
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