Publikation: Does Cohabitation Matter? : French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government
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2009
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West European Politics. 2009, 32(6), pp. 1140-1160. ISSN 0140-2382. eISSN 1743-9655. Available under: doi: 10.1080/01402380903230603
Zusammenfassung
This article analyses French European policy-making in the context of divided government, arguing that in the area of European policy-making cohabitation increases the number of veto players, as compared with unified government. The increase of veto players, in turn, reduces France's acceptance-sets at the European table and thereby introduces a status quo bias. In order to test this theory, use is made of a comparative case study design. Process-tracing and counterfactual analyses reveal that veto player theory can, indeed, be applied to the interactions of a split-executive government.
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LEUFFEN, Dirk, 2009. Does Cohabitation Matter? : French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government. In: West European Politics. 2009, 32(6), pp. 1140-1160. ISSN 0140-2382. eISSN 1743-9655. Available under: doi: 10.1080/01402380903230603BibTex
@article{Leuffen2009Cohab-37639, year={2009}, doi={10.1080/01402380903230603}, title={Does Cohabitation Matter? : French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government}, number={6}, volume={32}, issn={0140-2382}, journal={West European Politics}, pages={1140--1160}, author={Leuffen, Dirk} }
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