Renegotiation-proof relational contracts

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.
Datum
2013
Autor:innen
Kranz, Sebastian
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Games and Economic Behavior. 2013, 80, pp. 157-178. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009
Zusammenfassung

We study infinitely repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and assume that each period consists of two stages: one in which the players simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. In the first part of the paper, we derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. In the second part, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Renegotiation, Infinitely repeated games, Side payments, Optimal penal codes
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2013. Renegotiation-proof relational contracts. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2013, 80, pp. 157-178. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009
BibTex
@article{Goldlucke2013Reneg-28589,
  year={2013},
  doi={10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009},
  title={Renegotiation-proof relational contracts},
  volume={80},
  issn={0899-8256},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  pages={157--178},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/28589">
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/28589"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2013</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dc:creator>Goldlücke, Susanne</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:title>Renegotiation-proof relational contracts</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We study infinitely repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and assume that each period consists of two stages: one in which the players simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. In the first part of the paper, we derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. In the second part, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:contributor>Goldlücke, Susanne</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2014-07-30T08:31:16Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:creator>Kranz, Sebastian</dc:creator>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dc:contributor>Kranz, Sebastian</dc:contributor>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2014-07-30T08:31:16Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Games and Economic Behavior ; 80 (2013). - S. 157-178</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Nein
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen