## Renegotiation-proof relational contracts

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2013
Kranz, Sebastian
Journal article
##### Published in
Games and Economic Behavior ; 80 (2013). - pp. 157-178. - ISSN 0899-8256. - eISSN 1090-2473
##### Abstract
We study infinitely repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and assume that each period consists of two stages: one in which the players simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. In the first part of the paper, we derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. In the second part, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.
330 Economics
##### Keywords
Renegotiation,Infinitely repeated games,Side payments,Optimal penal codes
##### Cite This
ISO 690GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2013. Renegotiation-proof relational contracts. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 80, pp. 157-178. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009
BibTex
@article{Goldlucke2013Reneg-28589,
year={2013},
doi={10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009},
title={Renegotiation-proof relational contracts},
volume={80},
issn={0899-8256},
journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
pages={157--178},
author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
}

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