Renegotiation-proof relational contracts

Goldlücke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian

Renegotiation-proof relational contracts

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Date

2013

Authors

Goldlücke, Susanne

Kranz, Sebastian

Publication type

Journal article

Published in

Games and Economic Behavior ; 80 (2013). - pp. 157-178. - ISSN 0899-8256. - eISSN 1090-2473

Abstract

We study infinitely repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and assume that each period consists of two stages: one in which the players simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. In the first part of the paper, we derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. In the second part, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.

Subject (DDC)

330 Economics

Keywords

Renegotiation,Infinitely repeated games,Side payments,Optimal penal codes

Cite This

ISO 690

GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2013. Renegotiation-proof relational contracts. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 80, pp. 157-178. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009

BibTex

@article{Goldlucke2013Reneg-28589,
  year={2013},
  doi={10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009},
  title={Renegotiation-proof relational contracts},
  volume={80},
  issn={0899-8256},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  pages={157--178},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
}

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