State Concessions and Protest Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes

Leuschner, Elena; Hellmeier, Sebastian

State Concessions and Protest Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2023

Autor:innen

Leuschner, Elena

Hellmeier, Sebastian

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)

https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231169022

EU-Projektnummer

724191

Sammlungen

Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Comparative Political Studies. Sage. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/00104140231169022

Zusammenfassung

Autocrats typically respond with coercion when citizens take to the streets demanding political reform. Sometimes, however, they tolerate mass protests and even give in to protesters’ demands. While the effect of coercion on mobilization is well-studied, we know less about the role of concession-making. We argue that accommodating demands is rarely an effective strategy in demobilizing opposition movements. Authoritarian rulers are usually neither willing nor able to fully address protesters’ dynamic demands, nor can they offer credible commitments. We conduct a quantitative analysis using multiple cross-national data sets to empirically assess the relationship between concessions by the government and subsequent mass mobilization. By analyzing protest events in temporal and spatial proximity, we estimate the effect of making concessions on protest mobilization at the subnational level in 18 autocracies from 1991 to 2012. Our results indicate that concessions are associated with a significant and substantive increase in subsequent protest activity.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Schlagwörter

non-democratic regimes, protest, social movements, concessions

Zitieren

ISO 690

LEUSCHNER, Elena, Sebastian HELLMEIER, 2023. State Concessions and Protest Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes. In: Comparative Political Studies. Sage. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/00104140231169022

BibTex

@article{Leuschner2023-05-29State-67293,
  year={2023},
  doi={10.1177/00104140231169022},
  title={State Concessions and Protest Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes},
  issn={0010-4140},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  author={Leuschner, Elena and Hellmeier, Sebastian}
}

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Begutachtet

Ja