Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law
| dc.contributor.author | Friehe, Tim | |
| dc.contributor.author | Endres, Alfred | deu |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-01-19T12:23:45Z | deu |
| dc.date.available | 2012-01-19T12:23:45Z | deu |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | deu |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes the output and abatement choices of perfectly competitive downstream polluters who are subject to environmental liability law and procure abatement from an imperfectly competitive eco-industry. Under strict liability, polluting firms choose suboptimal abatement, but socially optimal output given abatement. Under negligence with firm-specific abatement standards, polluting firms choose suboptimal output but socially optimal abatement given output. Under negligence with industry-wide abatement standards, the output and abatement choices of most firms are socially suboptimal. Second-best considerations are offered for each case. Under strict liability (negligence), these apply to the level of liability (the behavioral standard). | eng |
| dc.description.version | published | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Publ. in: Land Economics ; 88 (2012), 1. - S. 121-138 | deu |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/17789 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | deu |
| dc.legacy.dateIssued | 2012-01-19 | deu |
| dc.rights | terms-of-use | deu |
| dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/ | deu |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | deu |
| dc.subject.jel | H23, Q58 | deu |
| dc.title | Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law | eng |
| dc.type | JOURNAL_ARTICLE | deu |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| kops.citation.bibtex | @article{Friehe2012Marke-17789,
year={2012},
title={Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law},
number={1},
volume={88},
journal={Land Economics},
pages={121--138},
author={Friehe, Tim and Endres, Alfred}
} | |
| kops.citation.iso690 | FRIEHE, Tim, Alfred ENDRES, 2012. Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law. In: Land Economics. 2012, 88(1), pp. 121-138 | deu |
| kops.citation.iso690 | FRIEHE, Tim, Alfred ENDRES, 2012. Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law. In: Land Economics. 2012, 88(1), pp. 121-138 | eng |
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| kops.flag.knbibliography | true | |
| kops.identifier.nbn | urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-177897 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield | Land Economics. 2012, <b>88</b>(1), pp. 121-138 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield.plain | Land Economics. 2012, 88(1), pp. 121-138 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield.plain | Land Economics. 2012, 88(1), pp. 121-138 | eng |
| kops.submitter.email | gundula.hadjiani@uni-konstanz.de | deu |
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| source.bibliographicInfo.toPage | 138 | |
| source.bibliographicInfo.volume | 88 | |
| source.periodicalTitle | Land Economics |
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