Publikation:

Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law

Lade...
Vorschaubild

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2012

Autor:innen

Endres, Alfred

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Land Economics. 2012, 88(1), pp. 121-138

Zusammenfassung

This paper analyzes the output and abatement choices of perfectly competitive downstream polluters who are subject to environmental liability law and procure abatement from an imperfectly competitive eco-industry. Under strict liability, polluting firms choose suboptimal abatement, but socially optimal output given abatement. Under negligence with firm-specific abatement standards, polluting firms choose suboptimal output but socially optimal abatement given output. Under negligence with industry-wide abatement standards, the output and abatement choices of most firms are socially suboptimal. Second-best considerations are offered for each case. Under strict liability (negligence), these apply to the level of liability (the behavioral standard).

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690FRIEHE, Tim, Alfred ENDRES, 2012. Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law. In: Land Economics. 2012, 88(1), pp. 121-138
BibTex
@article{Friehe2012Marke-17789,
  year={2012},
  title={Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law},
  number={1},
  volume={88},
  journal={Land Economics},
  pages={121--138},
  author={Friehe, Tim and Endres, Alfred}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/17789">
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper analyzes the output and abatement choices of perfectly competitive downstream polluters who are subject to environmental liability law and procure abatement from an imperfectly competitive eco-industry. Under strict liability, polluting firms choose suboptimal abatement, but socially optimal output given abatement. Under negligence with firm-specific abatement standards, polluting firms choose suboptimal output but socially optimal abatement given output. Under negligence with industry-wide abatement standards, the output and abatement choices of most firms are socially suboptimal. Second-best considerations are offered for each case. Under strict liability (negligence), these apply to the level of liability (the behavioral standard).</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-01-19T12:23:45Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-01-19T12:23:45Z</dc:date>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:creator>Endres, Alfred</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:title>Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law</dcterms:title>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/17789"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dc:creator>Friehe, Tim</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Publ. in: Land Economics ; 88 (2012), 1. - S. 121-138</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dc:contributor>Endres, Alfred</dc:contributor>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dc:contributor>Friehe, Tim</dc:contributor>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen