A Political Economy Explanation for In-kind Redistribution : The Interplay of Corruption and Democracy

Hessami, Zohal; Thum, Claudio; Uebelmesser, Silke

A Political Economy Explanation for In-kind Redistribution : The Interplay of Corruption and Democracy

Files

Hessami_0-274566.pdf(344.49 KB)

Date

2012

Authors

Hessami, Zohal

Thum, Claudio

Uebelmesser, Silke

Series

Working Paper Series / Department of Economics; 2012‐25

Publication type

Working Paper/Technical Report

Abstract

This paper identifies a novel political-economy explanation for the observed variation in the cash and in-kind (basic health care, public housing or food stamps) mixture of social transfers. We put forward the hypothesis that the share of in-kind transfers is positively correlated with corruption in democratic countries. The argument is derived in a theoretical model which assumes that it is easier for politicians to appropriate cash transfers than in-kind transfers. Voters in corrupt countries know that cash transfers invite corrupt behavior and therefore they elect parties that opt for in-kind redistributive measures. The empirical analysis for 34 OECD countries over the 1984 – 2007 period provides robust evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Moreover, the positive correlation between the in-kind share of social transfers and perceived corruption is stronger for the “most democratic” OECD countries and in countries with specific institutional characteristics such as free media that further enhance democratic accountability.

Subject (DDC)

330 Economics

Keywords

In-kind social transfers; redistribution; corruption; democracy; social expenditures

Cite This

ISO 690

HESSAMI, Zohal, Claudio THUM, Silke UEBELMESSER, 2012. A Political Economy Explanation for In-kind Redistribution : The Interplay of Corruption and Democracy

BibTex

@techreport{Hessami2012Polit-30233,
  year={2012},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={A Political Economy Explanation for In-kind Redistribution : The Interplay of Corruption and Democracy},
  number={2012‐25},
  author={Hessami, Zohal and Thum, Claudio and Uebelmesser, Silke}
}

RDF

<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/30233">
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/30233/3/Hessami_0-274566.pdf"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dc:contributor>Hessami, Zohal</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dc:contributor>Uebelmesser, Silke</dc:contributor>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/30233/3/Hessami_0-274566.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-03-12T10:55:10Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:creator>Thum, Claudio</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Hessami, Zohal</dc:creator>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper identifies a novel political-economy explanation for the observed variation in the cash and in-kind (basic health care, public housing or food stamps) mixture of social transfers. We put forward the hypothesis that the share of in-kind transfers is positively correlated with corruption in democratic countries. The argument is derived in a theoretical model which assumes that it is easier for politicians to appropriate cash transfers than in-kind transfers. Voters in corrupt countries know that cash transfers invite corrupt behavior and therefore they elect parties that opt for in-kind redistributive measures. The empirical analysis for 34 OECD countries over the 1984 – 2007 period provides robust evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Moreover, the positive correlation between the in-kind share of social transfers and perceived corruption is stronger for the “most democratic” OECD countries and in countries with specific institutional characteristics such as free media that further enhance democratic accountability.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:title>A Political Economy Explanation for In-kind Redistribution : The Interplay of Corruption and Democracy</dcterms:title>
    <dc:contributor>Thum, Claudio</dc:contributor>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-03-12T10:55:10Z</dc:date>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:creator>Uebelmesser, Silke</dc:creator>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/30233"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Bibliography of Konstanz

Yes