Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment
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2018
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The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2018, 120(4), pp. 1075-1099. ISSN 0347-0520. eISSN 1467-9442. Available under: doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12246
Zusammenfassung
We study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies set by benevolent governments. Consistent with real‐world practices, a government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. A lack of commitment, however, affects the optimal structure of education subsidies. The direction of the effect depends on how labor taxes are designed. With linear labor tax rates and a transfer for redistribution, subsidies become more progressive. By contrast, if the government is only constrained by informational asymmetries when designing taxes, subsidies become more regressive.
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330 Wirtschaft
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Inequality, time inconsistency
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FINDEISEN, Sebastian, Dominik SACHS, 2018. Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment. In: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2018, 120(4), pp. 1075-1099. ISSN 0347-0520. eISSN 1467-9442. Available under: doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12246BibTex
@article{Findeisen2018-10-03Educa-47681, year={2018}, doi={10.1111/sjoe.12246}, title={Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment}, number={4}, volume={120}, issn={0347-0520}, journal={The Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, pages={1075--1099}, author={Findeisen, Sebastian and Sachs, Dominik} }
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