Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment

dc.contributor.authorFindeisen, Sebastian
dc.contributor.authorSachs, Dominik
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-28T08:46:51Z
dc.date.available2019-11-28T08:46:51Z
dc.date.issued2018-10-03eng
dc.description.abstractWe study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies set by benevolent governments. Consistent with real‐world practices, a government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. A lack of commitment, however, affects the optimal structure of education subsidies. The direction of the effect depends on how labor taxes are designed. With linear labor tax rates and a transfer for redistribution, subsidies become more progressive. By contrast, if the government is only constrained by informational asymmetries when designing taxes, subsidies become more regressive.eng
dc.description.versionpublishedeng
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/sjoe.12246eng
dc.identifier.ppn1884511716
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/47681
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.subjectInequality, time inconsistencyeng
dc.subject.ddc330eng
dc.titleEducation Policies and Taxation without Commitmenteng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEeng
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@article{Findeisen2018-10-03Educa-47681,
  year={2018},
  doi={10.1111/sjoe.12246},
  title={Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment},
  number={4},
  volume={120},
  issn={0347-0520},
  journal={The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
  pages={1075--1099},
  author={Findeisen, Sebastian and Sachs, Dominik}
}
kops.citation.iso690FINDEISEN, Sebastian, Dominik SACHS, 2018. Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment. In: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2018, 120(4), pp. 1075-1099. ISSN 0347-0520. eISSN 1467-9442. Available under: doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12246deu
kops.citation.iso690FINDEISEN, Sebastian, Dominik SACHS, 2018. Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment. In: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2018, 120(4), pp. 1075-1099. ISSN 0347-0520. eISSN 1467-9442. Available under: doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12246eng
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source.periodicalTitleThe Scandinavian Journal of Economicseng

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