Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment

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2018
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The Scandinavian Journal of Economics ; 120 (2018), 4. - pp. 1075-1099. - ISSN 0347-0520. - eISSN 1467-9442
Abstract
We study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies set by benevolent governments. Consistent with real‐world practices, a government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. A lack of commitment, however, affects the optimal structure of education subsidies. The direction of the effect depends on how labor taxes are designed. With linear labor tax rates and a transfer for redistribution, subsidies become more progressive. By contrast, if the government is only constrained by informational asymmetries when designing taxes, subsidies become more regressive.
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330 Economics
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Inequality, time inconsistency
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ISO 690FINDEISEN, Sebastian, Dominik SACHS, 2018. Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment. In: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 120(4), pp. 1075-1099. ISSN 0347-0520. eISSN 1467-9442. Available under: doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12246
BibTex
@article{Findeisen2018-10-03Educa-47681,
  year={2018},
  doi={10.1111/sjoe.12246},
  title={Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment},
  number={4},
  volume={120},
  issn={0347-0520},
  journal={The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
  pages={1075--1099},
  author={Findeisen, Sebastian and Sachs, Dominik}
}
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