Optimal Sanctions and Endogeneity of Differences in Detection Probabilities

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2008
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Erschienen in
International Review of Law & Economics ; 28 (2008), 2. - S. 150-155
Zusammenfassung
Offenders differ with respect to their detection probability in reality. Bebchuk and Kaplow [Bebchuk, L. A., & Kaplow, L. (1993). Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals likelihood of avoiding detection. International Review of Law and Economics, 13, 217 224] conclude that optimal sanctions should increase with the ability to avoid detection. We endogenize differences in detection probabilities by letting individuals choose education. The optimal sanction schedule may be reversed if individuals do not account for all benefits of education. This paper thereby demonstrates how incentives for seemingly remote decisions can be manipulated through sanction structures.
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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Heterogeneous offenders,Optimal law enforcement,Education,Detection probability
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ISO 690FRIEHE, Tim, 2008. Optimal Sanctions and Endogeneity of Differences in Detection Probabilities. In: International Review of Law & Economics. 28(2), pp. 150-155. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2008.02.004
BibTex
@article{Friehe2008Optim-1799,
  year={2008},
  doi={10.1016/j.irle.2008.02.004},
  title={Optimal Sanctions and Endogeneity of Differences in Detection Probabilities},
  number={2},
  volume={28},
  journal={International Review of Law & Economics},
  pages={150--155},
  author={Friehe, Tim}
}
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