## A Chance for Attributable Agency

2015
263227
Journal article
##### Published in
Minds and Machines ; 25 (2015), 3. - pp. 261-279. - ISSN 0924-6495. - eISSN 1572-8641
##### Abstract
Can we sensibly attribute some of the happenings in our world to the agency of some of the things around us? We do this all the time, but there are conceptual challenges purporting to show that attributable agency, and specifically one of its most important subspecies, human free agency, is incoherent. We address these challenges in a novel way: rather than merely rebutting specific arguments, we discuss a concrete model that we claim positively illustrates attributable agency in an indeterministic setting. The model, recently introduced by one of the authors in the context of artificial intelligence, shows that an agent with a sufficiently complex memory organization can employ indeterministic happenings in a meaningful way. We claim that these considerations successfully counter arguments against the coherence of libertarian (indeterminism-based) free will.
100 Philosophy
##### Keywords
Free will; Agency; Libertarianism; Indeterminism; Projective simulation
##### Cite This
ISO 690BRIEGEL, Hans J., Thomas MÜLLER, 2015. A Chance for Attributable Agency. In: Minds and Machines. 25(3), pp. 261-279. ISSN 0924-6495. eISSN 1572-8641. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11023-015-9381-y
BibTex
@article{Briegel2015Chanc-31542,
year={2015},
doi={10.1007/s11023-015-9381-y},
title={A Chance for Attributable Agency},
number={3},
volume={25},
issn={0924-6495},
journal={Minds and Machines},
pages={261--279},
author={Briegel, Hans J. and Müller, Thomas},
note={H. J. B. acknowledges support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) through the SFB FoQuS F 4012. T. M. acknowledges support by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant agreement nr 263227. H. J. B. and T. M. both acknowledge support by the Templeton World Charity Foundation Grant TWCF0078/AB46.}
}

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##### Comment on publication
H. J. B. acknowledges support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) through the SFB FoQuS F 4012. T. M. acknowledges support by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant agreement nr 263227. H. J. B. and T. M. both acknowledge support by the Templeton World Charity Foundation Grant TWCF0078/AB46.
Yes