Are the rich too rich to be expropriated? : Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution
Are the rich too rich to be expropriated? : Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution
No Thumbnail Available
Files
There are no files associated with this item.
Date
1998
Editors
Journal ISSN
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliographical data
Publisher
Series
DOI (citable link)
International patent number
Link to the license
oops
EU project number
Project
Open Access publication
Collections
Title in another language
Publication type
Journal article
Publication status
Published
Published in
Public Choice ; 94 (1998), 1-2. - pp. 135-156. - ISSN 0048-5829. - eISSN 1573-7101
Abstract
Why is it that, in democracies, the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them? In this paper we analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful. We demonstrate that the economically powerful, i.e. the above-average income earners, are indeed in a position to bribe the small segment of the voters with incomes between the median and the mean to resist the temptation of supporting confiscatory taxation. This is true even if compensation payments in cash are politically unfeasible and therefore need to be made in terms of an evenly distributed private good; and it may even be true if only pure public goods are available to swing the middle class.
Summary in another language
Subject (DDC)
330 Economics
Keywords
Conference
Review
undefined / . - undefined, undefined. - (undefined; undefined)
Cite This
ISO 690
BREYER, Friedrich, Heinrich URSPRUNG, 1998. Are the rich too rich to be expropriated? : Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution. In: Public Choice. 94(1-2), pp. 135-156. ISSN 0048-5829. eISSN 1573-7101. Available under: doi: 10.1023/A:1004932822295BibTex
@article{Breyer1998expro-33345, year={1998}, doi={10.1023/A:1004932822295}, title={Are the rich too rich to be expropriated? : Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution}, url={http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024329}, number={1-2}, volume={94}, issn={0048-5829}, journal={Public Choice}, pages={135--156}, author={Breyer, Friedrich and Ursprung, Heinrich} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/33345"> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-03-16T10:59:30Z</dc:date> <dc:contributor>Breyer, Friedrich</dc:contributor> <dcterms:title>Are the rich too rich to be expropriated? : Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution</dcterms:title> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Why is it that, in democracies, the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them? In this paper we analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful. We demonstrate that the economically powerful, i.e. the above-average income earners, are indeed in a position to bribe the small segment of the voters with incomes between the median and the mean to resist the temptation of supporting confiscatory taxation. This is true even if compensation payments in cash are politically unfeasible and therefore need to be made in terms of an evenly distributed private good; and it may even be true if only pure public goods are available to swing the middle class.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-03-16T10:59:30Z</dcterms:available> <dc:creator>Ursprung, Heinrich</dc:creator> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:creator>Breyer, Friedrich</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Ursprung, Heinrich</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>1998</dcterms:issued> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/33345"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
Internal note
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
URL of original publication
Test date of URL
2016-03-16
Examination date of dissertation
Method of financing
Comment on publication
Alliance license
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
International Co-Authors
Bibliography of Konstanz
No