Publikation:

Are the rich too rich to be expropriated? : Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution

Vorschaubild

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

1998

Autor:innen

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

URI (zitierfähiger Link)
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004932822295
ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Public Choice. 1998, 94(1-2), pp. 135-156. ISSN 0048-5829. eISSN 1573-7101. Available under: doi: 10.1023/A:1004932822295

Zusammenfassung

Why is it that, in democracies, the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them? In this paper we analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful. We demonstrate that the economically powerful, i.e. the above-average income earners, are indeed in a position to bribe the small segment of the voters with incomes between the median and the mean to resist the temptation of supporting confiscatory taxation. This is true even if compensation payments in cash are politically unfeasible and therefore need to be made in terms of an evenly distributed private good; and it may even be true if only pure public goods are available to swing the middle class.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690BREYER, Friedrich, Heinrich URSPRUNG, 1998. Are the rich too rich to be expropriated? : Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution. In: Public Choice. 1998, 94(1-2), pp. 135-156. ISSN 0048-5829. eISSN 1573-7101. Available under: doi: 10.1023/A:1004932822295
BibTex
@article{Breyer1998expro-33345,
  year={1998},
  doi={10.1023/A:1004932822295},
  title={Are the rich too rich to be expropriated? : Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution},
  url={http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024329},
  number={1-2},
  volume={94},
  issn={0048-5829},
  journal={Public Choice},
  pages={135--156},
  author={Breyer, Friedrich and Ursprung, Heinrich}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/33345">
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-03-16T10:59:30Z</dc:date>
    <dc:contributor>Breyer, Friedrich</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:title>Are the rich too rich to be expropriated? : Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Why is it that, in democracies, the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them? In this paper we analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful. We demonstrate that the economically powerful, i.e. the above-average income earners, are indeed in a position to bribe the small segment of the voters with incomes between the median and the mean to resist the temptation of supporting confiscatory taxation. This is true even if compensation payments in cash are politically unfeasible and therefore need to be made in terms of an evenly distributed private good; and it may even be true if only pure public goods are available to swing the middle class.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-03-16T10:59:30Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:creator>Ursprung, Heinrich</dc:creator>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dc:creator>Breyer, Friedrich</dc:creator>
    <dc:contributor>Ursprung, Heinrich</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:issued>1998</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/33345"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024329

Prüfdatum der URL

2016-03-16

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Nein
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen