@article{Shikano2009Strat-2764,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1080/01402380902779147},
  title={Strategic voting under proportional representation: threshold insurance in German Elections},
  number={3},
  volume={32},
  journal={West European Politics},
  pages={634--656},
  author={Shikano, Susumu and Herrmann, Michael and Thurner, Paul W.}
}

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    <dc:contributor>Herrmann, Michael</dc:contributor>
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    <dc:contributor>Shikano, Susumu</dc:contributor>
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    <dc:contributor>Thurner, Paul W.</dc:contributor>
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    <dc:creator>Shikano, Susumu</dc:creator>
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    <dcterms:title>Strategic voting under proportional representation: threshold insurance in German Elections</dcterms:title>
    <dc:creator>Thurner, Paul W.</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Does proportional representation imply incentives for strategic voting? This article investigates whether adherents of themajor German parties voted against their preference in order to increase the chance of amajority coalition between their favourite party and the preelectorally declared junior coalition partner. Focusing exclusively on the PR vote, the authors test whether strategic voting is guided by expectations with regard to the coalition formation stage. To that end they use a two-step estimation procedure to simultaneously predict (in-)complete party preferences and sincere and strategic voting in a andomutility framework. Their results show that voters  preferences, rather than mapping directly into party choice, are affected by their expectations on small parties  re-entry chances.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Publ. in: West European Politics, 32 (2009), 3, pp. 634-656</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
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