Publikation: Buying Supermajorities in the Lab
Dateien
Datum
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Publikationsstatus
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the literature on vote-buying is the legislative lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that lobbies will optimally form supermajorities in many cases. Providing the first empirical assessment of this prominent model, we test its central predictions in the laboratory. While the model assumes sequential moves, we relax this assumption in additional treatments with simultaneous moves. We find that lobbies buy supermajorities as predicted by the theory. Our results also provide supporting evidence for most comparative statics predictions of the legislative lobbying model with respect to lobbies' willingness to pay and legislators' preferences. Most of these results carry over to the simultaneous-move set-up but the predictive power of the model declines.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
Zitieren
ISO 690
FEHRLER, Sebastian, Maik T. SCHNEIDER, 2019. Buying Supermajorities in the LabBibTex
@techreport{Fehrler2019Buyin-50218, year={2019}, series={IZA Discussion Papers}, title={Buying Supermajorities in the Lab}, number={12477}, url={https://www.iza.org/de/publications/dp/12477/buying-supermajorities-in-the-lab}, author={Fehrler, Sebastian and Schneider, Maik T.} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/50218"> <dc:creator>Fehrler, Sebastian</dc:creator> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> <dc:contributor>Schneider, Maik T.</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/50218"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dc:contributor>Fehrler, Sebastian</dc:contributor> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:creator>Schneider, Maik T.</dc:creator> <dcterms:title>Buying Supermajorities in the Lab</dcterms:title> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-07-13T11:23:19Z</dc:date> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43613"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43613"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-07-13T11:23:19Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:issued>2019</dcterms:issued> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the literature on vote-buying is the legislative lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that lobbies will optimally form supermajorities in many cases. Providing the first empirical assessment of this prominent model, we test its central predictions in the laboratory. While the model assumes sequential moves, we relax this assumption in additional treatments with simultaneous moves. We find that lobbies buy supermajorities as predicted by the theory. Our results also provide supporting evidence for most comparative statics predictions of the legislative lobbying model with respect to lobbies' willingness to pay and legislators' preferences. Most of these results carry over to the simultaneous-move set-up but the predictive power of the model declines.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>