Sequential Torts and Bilateral Harm

Friehe, Tim

Sequential Torts and Bilateral Harm

Dateien

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Datum

2009

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

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International Review of Law & Economics. 2009, 29(2), pp. 161-168. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2008.10.002

Zusammenfassung

This paper analyzes care incentives of individuals in a bilateral-harm setting if care choices are sequential. We find that the efficient outcome is not guaranteed under any liability rule considered, irrespective of whether information is perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to generally rank liability rules according to their induced social costs. These findings are in strong contrast to the sequential-torts setting in which harm is unilateral.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Care incentives, Sequential care, Bilateral harm, Tort law

Zitieren

ISO 690

FRIEHE, Tim, 2009. Sequential Torts and Bilateral Harm. In: International Review of Law & Economics. 2009, 29(2), pp. 161-168. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2008.10.002

BibTex

@article{Friehe2009Seque-1839,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1016/j.irle.2008.10.002},
  title={Sequential Torts and Bilateral Harm},
  number={2},
  volume={29},
  journal={International Review of Law & Economics},
  pages={161--168},
  author={Friehe, Tim}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

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