Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains
Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains
Lade...
Datum
2007
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
eISSN
item.preview.dc.identifier.isbn
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Link zur Lizenz
EU-Projektnummer
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Sammlungen
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Erschienen in
British Journal of Political Science ; 37 (2007), 2. - S. 281-312
Zusammenfassung
This article is a study of bicameral conflict resolution between the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union, which has established a bicameral conciliation process under the co-decision procedure. Scholars commonly agree that the European Parliament has gained power under the co-decision procedure, but the impact of the conciliation process on the power distribution between the Council and the European Parliament remains unclear. The scholarly debate suggests that the power of the institutional actors depends on their proximity to the status quo, the (im-)patience and the specific preference distribution of the institutional actors, although most analyses assume that the Commission plays an insignificant role. Using an ordered probit model, this study examines the power distribution between the two institutional actors, the factors for their bargaining success and the role of the Commission in the period between 1999 and 2002. The findings show that the European Parliament wins most conflicts, but that the Council is more successful in multi-dimensional disputes. The results confirm some theoretical claims made in the literature, such as the importance of the status quo location and of preference cohesiveness. However, they also reject a major assumption in the literature on the irrelevance of the Commission in the conciliation process, which we show to have an influential informational position for parliamentary success.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined. - (undefined; undefined)
Zitieren
ISO 690
KÖNIG, Thomas, Bjorn LINDBERG, Sandra LECHNER, Winfried POHLMEIER, 2007. Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains. In: British Journal of Political Science. 37(2), pp. 281-312. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S0007123407000142BibTex
@article{Konig2007Bicam-11790, year={2007}, doi={10.1017/S0007123407000142}, title={Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains}, number={2}, volume={37}, journal={British Journal of Political Science}, pages={281--312}, author={König, Thomas and Lindberg, Bjorn and Lechner, Sandra and Pohlmeier, Winfried} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/11790"> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: British Journal of Political Science 37 (2007), 2, pp. 281-312</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:creator>Lechner, Sandra</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Pohlmeier, Winfried</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11790"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This article is a study of bicameral conflict resolution between the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union, which has established a bicameral conciliation process under the co-decision procedure. Scholars commonly agree that the European Parliament has gained power under the co-decision procedure, but the impact of the conciliation process on the power distribution between the Council and the European Parliament remains unclear. The scholarly debate suggests that the power of the institutional actors depends on their proximity to the status quo, the (im-)patience and the specific preference distribution of the institutional actors, although most analyses assume that the Commission plays an insignificant role. Using an ordered probit model, this study examines the power distribution between the two institutional actors, the factors for their bargaining success and the role of the Commission in the period between 1999 and 2002. The findings show that the European Parliament wins most conflicts, but that the Council is more successful in multi-dimensional disputes. The results confirm some theoretical claims made in the literature, such as the importance of the status quo location and of preference cohesiveness. However, they also reject a major assumption in the literature on the irrelevance of the Commission in the conciliation process, which we show to have an influential informational position for parliamentary success.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:contributor>Lechner, Sandra</dc:contributor> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/11790/1/Koenig_Lindberg_Lechner_Pohlmeier_Bicameral_Conflict_Solution_BJPS_2007.pdf"/> <dc:contributor>Lindberg, Bjorn</dc:contributor> <dc:rights>Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Generic</dc:rights> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/11790/1/Koenig_Lindberg_Lechner_Pohlmeier_Bicameral_Conflict_Solution_BJPS_2007.pdf"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:40:18Z</dc:date> <dcterms:title>Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains</dcterms:title> <dcterms:issued>2007</dcterms:issued> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dc:contributor>König, Thomas</dc:contributor> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:creator>Pohlmeier, Winfried</dc:creator> <dc:creator>König, Thomas</dc:creator> <dc:creator>Lindberg, Bjorn</dc:creator> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:40:18Z</dcterms:available> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja