Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

Goldlücke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian

Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

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Date

2012

Authors

Goldlücke, Susanne

Kranz, Sebastian

Publication type

Journal article

Published in

Economics Letters ; 117 (2012), 2. - pp. 405-407. - ISSN 0165-1765. - eISSN 1873-7374

Abstract

This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring technology, lower generated surplus, lower complementarity of efforts, or a larger team of workers.

Subject (DDC)

330 Economics

Keywords

Relational contracts,Delegation,Monitoring,Job design,Moral hazard in teams

Cite This

ISO 690

GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2012. Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts. In: Economics Letters. 117(2), pp. 405-407. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019

BibTex

@article{Goldlucke2012Deleg-28568,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019},
  title={Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts},
  number={2},
  volume={117},
  issn={0165-1765},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  pages={405--407},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
}

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