Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

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2012
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Kranz, Sebastian
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Zusammenfassung

This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring technology, lower generated surplus, lower complementarity of efforts, or a larger team of workers.

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330 Wirtschaft
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Relational contracts, Delegation, Monitoring, Job design, Moral hazard in teams
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ISO 690GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2012. Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts. In: Economics Letters. 2012, 117(2), pp. 405-407. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019
BibTex
@article{Goldlucke2012Deleg-28568,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019},
  title={Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts},
  number={2},
  volume={117},
  issn={0165-1765},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  pages={405--407},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
}
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