Publikation: Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts
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2012
Autor:innen
Kranz, Sebastian
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Economics Letters. 2012, 117(2), pp. 405-407. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019
Zusammenfassung
This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring technology, lower generated surplus, lower complementarity of efforts, or a larger team of workers.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Relational contracts, Delegation, Monitoring, Job design, Moral hazard in teams
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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2012. Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts. In: Economics Letters. 2012, 117(2), pp. 405-407. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019BibTex
@article{Goldlucke2012Deleg-28568,
year={2012},
doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019},
title={Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts},
number={2},
volume={117},
issn={0165-1765},
journal={Economics Letters},
pages={405--407},
author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
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