Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

Goldlücke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian

Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2012

Autor:innen

Goldlücke, Susanne

Kranz, Sebastian

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Economics Letters. 2012, 117(2), pp. 405-407. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019

Zusammenfassung

This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring technology, lower generated surplus, lower complementarity of efforts, or a larger team of workers.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Relational contracts, Delegation, Monitoring, Job design, Moral hazard in teams

Zitieren

ISO 690

GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2012. Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts. In: Economics Letters. 2012, 117(2), pp. 405-407. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019

BibTex

@article{Goldlucke2012Deleg-28568,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019},
  title={Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts},
  number={2},
  volume={117},
  issn={0165-1765},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  pages={405--407},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
}

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