Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts
Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts
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Date
2012
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Kranz, Sebastian
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Economics Letters ; 117 (2012), 2. - pp. 405-407. - ISSN 0165-1765. - eISSN 1873-7374
Abstract
This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring technology, lower generated surplus, lower complementarity of efforts, or a larger team of workers.
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330 Economics
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Relational contracts,Delegation,Monitoring,Job design,Moral hazard in teams
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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2012. Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts. In: Economics Letters. 117(2), pp. 405-407. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019BibTex
@article{Goldlucke2012Deleg-28568, year={2012}, doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019}, title={Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts}, number={2}, volume={117}, issn={0165-1765}, journal={Economics Letters}, pages={405--407}, author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian} }
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