An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model

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2006
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Zusammenfassung

The dissertation argues against the idea that reasons for action are provided by human desires (I call this the Model). After spelling out three versions of the Model, I go on to attack it from three angles. I first argue that the most plausible meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism, but that the naturalist Model cannot vindicate the reduction it proposes and this is unacceptable. After this, I present and defend an approach that questions the idea that the reason-relation must make reference to human desires. The alternative approach argues that desires only transmit reasons on which they are themselves based. Finally, I argue that the right theory of motivation is cognitivist and not Humean in character.

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100 Philosophie
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ISO 690TANYI, Attila, 2006. An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model
BibTex
@book{Tanyi2006Essay-17045,
  year={2006},
  title={An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model},
  author={Tanyi, Attila},
  note={Zugl.: Budapest, Univ., Diss., 2006}
}
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December 14, 2006
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Zugl.: Budapest, Univ., Diss., 2006
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