Holding Individual Representatives Accountable : The Role of Electoral Systems

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2016
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Däubler, Thomas
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The Journal of Politics ; 78 (2016), 3. - S. 746-762. - University of Chicago Press. - ISSN 0022-3816. - eISSN 1468-2508
Zusammenfassung
Voters are reluctant to sanction representatives for individual misconduct if they have to balance candidate-level and party-level factors in their choice, but this trade-off is affected by the electoral system. Our general theoretical model explains why individual accountability can empirically occur in single-member district (SMD) systems but is expected under less restrictive conditions using open-list proportional representation (OLPR). The latter not only decouples party and candidate choice but also makes seat allocation more vote elastic. For a thorough empirical test of our argument, we draw on real-world evidence from state-level elections in Bavaria, Germany, which are held under an unusual mixed-member system. Exploiting a recent public scandal involving one-third of representatives, we examine how electoral punishment of the same candidates by the same voters differs across electoral rules. Drawing on difference-in-differences as well as matching/regression estimators, we show that electoral punishment is substantially larger under OLPR than under SMD systems.
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ISO 690RUDOLPH, Lukas, Thomas DÄUBLER, 2016. Holding Individual Representatives Accountable : The Role of Electoral Systems. In: The Journal of Politics. University of Chicago Press. 78(3), pp. 746-762. ISSN 0022-3816. eISSN 1468-2508. Available under: doi: 10.1086/685378
BibTex
@article{Rudolph2016Holdi-66663,
  year={2016},
  doi={10.1086/685378},
  title={Holding Individual Representatives Accountable : The Role of Electoral Systems},
  number={3},
  volume={78},
  issn={0022-3816},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={746--762},
  author={Rudolph, Lukas and Däubler, Thomas}
}
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