Holding Individual Representatives Accountable : The Role of Electoral Systems

Rudolph, Lukas; Däubler, Thomas

Holding Individual Representatives Accountable : The Role of Electoral Systems

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2016

Autor:innen

Rudolph, Lukas

Däubler, Thomas

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)

10.1086/685378

Sammlungen

Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

The Journal of Politics ; 78 (2016), 3. - S. 746-762. - University of Chicago Press. - ISSN 0022-3816. - eISSN 1468-2508

Zusammenfassung

Voters are reluctant to sanction representatives for individual misconduct if they have to balance candidate-level and party-level factors in their choice, but this trade-off is affected by the electoral system. Our general theoretical model explains why individual accountability can empirically occur in single-member district (SMD) systems but is expected under less restrictive conditions using open-list proportional representation (OLPR). The latter not only decouples party and candidate choice but also makes seat allocation more vote elastic. For a thorough empirical test of our argument, we draw on real-world evidence from state-level elections in Bavaria, Germany, which are held under an unusual mixed-member system. Exploiting a recent public scandal involving one-third of representatives, we examine how electoral punishment of the same candidates by the same voters differs across electoral rules. Drawing on difference-in-differences as well as matching/regression estimators, we show that electoral punishment is substantially larger under OLPR than under SMD systems.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Zitieren

ISO 690

RUDOLPH, Lukas, Thomas DÄUBLER, 2016. Holding Individual Representatives Accountable : The Role of Electoral Systems. In: The Journal of Politics. University of Chicago Press. 78(3), pp. 746-762. ISSN 0022-3816. eISSN 1468-2508. Available under: doi: 10.1086/685378

BibTex

@article{Rudolph2016Holdi-66663,
  year={2016},
  doi={10.1086/685378},
  title={Holding Individual Representatives Accountable : The Role of Electoral Systems},
  number={3},
  volume={78},
  issn={0022-3816},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={746--762},
  author={Rudolph, Lukas and Däubler, Thomas}
}

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