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Explaining safety failures in NetKAT

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2021

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlamp.2021.100676
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Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming. Elsevier. 2021, 121, 100676. ISSN 2352-2208. eISSN 2352-2216. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jlamp.2021.100676

Zusammenfassung

This work introduces a concept of explanations with respect to the violation of safe behaviours within software defined networks (SDNs) expressible in NetKAT. The latter is a network programming language based on a well-studied mathematical structure, namely, Kleene Algebra with Tests (KAT). Amongst others, the mathematical foundation of NetKAT gave rise to a sound and complete equational theory. In our setting, a safe behaviour is characterised by a NetKAT policy, or program, which does not enable forwarding packets from an ingress i to an undesirable egress e. We show how explanations for safety violations can be derived in an equational fashion, according to a modification of the existing NetKAT axiomatisation. We propose an approach based on the Maude system for actually computing the undesired behaviours witnessing the forwarding of packets from i to e as above. SDN-SafeCheck is a tool based on Maude equational theories satisfying important properties such as Church-Rosser and termination. SDN-SafeCheck automatically identifies all the undesired behaviours leading to e, covering forwarding paths up to a user specified size.

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004 Informatik

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Software defined networks; NetKAT; Safety; Failure analysis; Axiomatisations; The Maude system

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ISO 690CALTAIS, Georgiana, Hünkar Can TUNC, 2021. Explaining safety failures in NetKAT. In: Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming. Elsevier. 2021, 121, 100676. ISSN 2352-2208. eISSN 2352-2216. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jlamp.2021.100676
BibTex
@article{Caltais2021Expla-53915,
  year={2021},
  doi={10.1016/j.jlamp.2021.100676},
  title={Explaining safety failures in NetKAT},
  volume={121},
  issn={2352-2208},
  journal={Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming},
  author={Caltais, Georgiana and Tunc, Hünkar Can},
  note={Article Number: 100676}
}
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