Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation

Spohn, Wolfgang

Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation

Dateien

Spohn_2003_Dependency_Equilibria.pdfGröße: 445.62 KBDownloads: 485

Datum

2003

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Philosophie

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Homo Oeconomicus. 2003, 20, pp. 195-255

Zusammenfassung

The paper attempts to rationalize cooperation in the one-shot prisoners' dilemma (PD). It starts by introducing (and preliminarily investigating) a new kind of equilibrium (differing from Aumann's correlated equilibria) according to which the players' actions may be correlated (sect. 2). In PD the Pareto-optimal among these equilibria is joint cooperation. Since these equilibria seem to contradict causal preconceptions, the paper continues with a standard analysis of the causal structure of decision situations (sect. 3). The analysis then raises to a reflexive point of view according to which the agent integrates his own present and future decision situations into the causal picture of his situation (sect. 4). This reflexive structure is first applied to the toxin puzzle and then to Newcomb's problem, showing a way to rationalize drinking the toxin and taking only one box with-out assuming causal mystery (sect. 5). The latter result is finally extended to a rationalization of cooperation in PD (sect. 6).

Fachgebiet (DDC)

100 Philosophie

Zitieren

ISO 690

SPOHN, Wolfgang, 2003. Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation. In: Homo Oeconomicus. 2003, 20, pp. 195-255

BibTex

@article{Spohn2003Depen-3505,
  year={2003},
  title={Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation},
  volume={20},
  journal={Homo Oeconomicus},
  pages={195--255},
  author={Spohn, Wolfgang}
}

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