The value of say on pay

Kind, Axel; Poltera, Marco; Zaia, Johannes

The value of say on pay

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2024

Autor:innen

Kind, Axel

Poltera, Marco

Zaia, Johannes

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107311

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Hybrid

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Journal of Banking & Finance. Elsevier. 2024, 169, 107311. ISSN 0378-4266. eISSN 1872-6372. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107311

Zusammenfassung

We measure the impact of “say on pay” (SoP) – mandatory shareholder votes on top-management compensation – on the market value of voting rights. By exploiting the staggered introduction of SoP across 14 economies, we show that SoP does not automatically increase the value of shareholder voting rights. While stricter, binding SoP reforms increase voting values, looser advisory SoP laws decrease them. Firms that do not pay their CEOs excessively experience the largest decreases in voting values. Voting values also reflect a country’s level of investor protection, past dissent in SoP ballots, and dynamically adjust to changes in managerial compensation.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Say on pay, Shareholder voting rights, Corporate governance, Option pricing

Zitieren

ISO 690

KIND, Axel, Marco POLTERA, Johannes ZAIA, 2024. The value of say on pay. In: Journal of Banking & Finance. Elsevier. 2024, 169, 107311. ISSN 0378-4266. eISSN 1872-6372. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107311

BibTex

@article{Kind2024-09value-70845,
  year={2024},
  doi={10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107311},
  title={The value of say on pay},
  volume={169},
  issn={0378-4266},
  journal={Journal of Banking & Finance},
  author={Kind, Axel and Poltera, Marco and Zaia, Johannes},
  note={Article Number: 107311}
}

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