Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? : governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany

Lehmann, Erik; Weigand, Jürgen

Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? : governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany

Dateien

426_1.pdfGröße: 75.99 KBDownloads: 2519

Datum

2000

Autor:innen

Lehmann, Erik

Weigand, Jürgen

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

The paper investigates the impact of corporate governance on the performance of 361 German corporations over the time period 1991 to 1996. We find ownership concentration to affect profitability significantly negatively. Representation of owners on the board of executive directors does not make difference. The profitability-ownership concentration relation depends on both stock market exposure and the location of control rights. The negative effect of ownership concentration can be traced back to foreign- or family-owned non-quoted firms as well as quoted firms with different large shareholders. A positive impact of ownership concentration on profitability, supportive of managerial discretion and agency theories shows up for quoted firms which have financial institutions as large shareholders. Our results imply that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarly enhance profitability, and (2) the high degree of ownership concentration seems to be a sub-optimal choice for many of the tightly held German corporations.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

firm performance, managerial discretion, governance structures, ownership concentration

Zitieren

ISO 690

LEHMANN, Erik, Jürgen WEIGAND, 2000. Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? : governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany

BibTex

@techreport{Lehmann2000Gover-11808,
  year={2000},
  series={CoFE-Diskussionspapiere / Zentrum für Finanzen und Ökonometrie},
  title={Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? : governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany},
  number={2000/05},
  author={Lehmann, Erik and Weigand, Jürgen}
}

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