Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.
Datum
2009
Autor:innen
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung

We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690SCHINDLER, Dirk, Guttorm SCHJELDERUP, 2009. Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior. In: Journal of Public Economic Theory. Wiley-Blackwell. 2009, 11(4), pp. 599-621. ISSN 1097-3923. eISSN 1467-9779. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01422.x
BibTex
@article{Schindler2009Harmo-58104,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01422.x},
  title={Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior},
  number={4},
  volume={11},
  issn={1097-3923},
  journal={Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  pages={599--621},
  author={Schindler, Dirk and Schjelderup, Guttorm}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/58104">
    <dc:creator>Schjelderup, Guttorm</dc:creator>
    <dc:contributor>Schjelderup, Guttorm</dc:contributor>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-07-21T07:23:14Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Schindler, Dirk</dc:creator>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:contributor>Schindler, Dirk</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:title>Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-07-21T07:23:14Z</dcterms:available>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/58104"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2009</dcterms:issued>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Ja
Diese Publikation teilen