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Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior

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2009

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Schjelderup, Guttorm

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Journal of Public Economic Theory. Wiley-Blackwell. 2009, 11(4), pp. 599-621. ISSN 1097-3923. eISSN 1467-9779. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01422.x

Zusammenfassung

We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.

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330 Wirtschaft

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ISO 690SCHINDLER, Dirk, Guttorm SCHJELDERUP, 2009. Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior. In: Journal of Public Economic Theory. Wiley-Blackwell. 2009, 11(4), pp. 599-621. ISSN 1097-3923. eISSN 1467-9779. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01422.x
BibTex
@article{Schindler2009Harmo-58104,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01422.x},
  title={Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior},
  number={4},
  volume={11},
  issn={1097-3923},
  journal={Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  pages={599--621},
  author={Schindler, Dirk and Schjelderup, Guttorm}
}
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