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Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information

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2013

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Matschke, Xenia
Schöttner, Anja

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-255477
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https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2010.028
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Southern Economic Journal. 2013, 80(1), pp. 81-105. ISSN 0038-4038. Available under: doi: 10.4284/0038-4038-2010.028

Zusammenfassung

Trade liberalization under GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection, possibly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping. This article investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework, in which the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. We show that by designing a tariff schedule contingent on firms' cost reports and accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeed in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. The antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may thus not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

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ISO 690MATSCHKE, Xenia, Anja SCHÖTTNER, 2013. Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information. In: Southern Economic Journal. 2013, 80(1), pp. 81-105. ISSN 0038-4038. Available under: doi: 10.4284/0038-4038-2010.028
BibTex
@article{Matschke2013Antid-25547,
  year={2013},
  doi={10.4284/0038-4038-2010.028},
  title={Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information},
  number={1},
  volume={80},
  issn={0038-4038},
  journal={Southern Economic Journal},
  pages={81--105},
  author={Matschke, Xenia and Schöttner, Anja}
}
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