Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test

Kano, Fumihiro; Krupenye, Christopher; Hirata, Satoshi; Tomonaga, Masaki; Call, Josep

Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test

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Datum

2019

Autor:innen

Kano, Fumihiro

Krupenye, Christopher

Hirata, Satoshi

Tomonaga, Masaki

Call, Josep

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)

https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1910095116

Sammlungen

Biologie

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. National Academy of Sciences. 2019, 116(42), pp. 20904-20909. ISSN 0027-8424. eISSN 1091-6490. Available under: doi: 10.1073/pnas.1910095116

Zusammenfassung

Human social life depends on theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. A signature of theory of mind, false belief understanding, requires representing others' views of the world, even when they conflict with one's own. After decades of research, it remains controversial whether any nonhuman species possess a theory of mind. One challenge to positive evidence of animal theory of mind, the behavior-rule account, holds that animals solve such tasks by responding to others' behavioral cues rather than their mental states. We distinguish these hypotheses by implementing a version of the "goggles" test, which asks whether, in the absence of any additional behavioral cues, animals can use their own self-experience of a novel barrier being translucent or opaque to determine whether another agent can see through the same barrier. We incorporated this paradigm into an established anticipatory-looking false-belief test for great apes. In a between-subjects design, apes experienced a novel barrier as either translucent or opaque, although both looked identical from afar. While being eye tracked, all apes then watched a video in which an actor saw an object hidden under 1 of 2 identical boxes. The actor then scuttled behind the novel barrier, at which point the object was relocated and then removed. Only apes who experienced the barrier as opaque visually anticipated that the actor would mistakenly search for the object in its previous location. Great apes, therefore, appeared to attribute differential visual access based specifically on their own past perceptual experience to anticipate an agent's actions in a false-belief test.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

570 Biowissenschaften, Biologie

Schlagwörter

anticipatory looking, behavior rule, goggles test, nonhuman animals, theory of mind

Zitieren

ISO 690

KANO, Fumihiro, Christopher KRUPENYE, Satoshi HIRATA, Masaki TOMONAGA, Josep CALL, 2019. Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. National Academy of Sciences. 2019, 116(42), pp. 20904-20909. ISSN 0027-8424. eISSN 1091-6490. Available under: doi: 10.1073/pnas.1910095116

BibTex

@article{Kano2019Great-55052,
  year={2019},
  doi={10.1073/pnas.1910095116},
  title={Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test},
  number={42},
  volume={116},
  issn={0027-8424},
  journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America},
  pages={20904--20909},
  author={Kano, Fumihiro and Krupenye, Christopher and Hirata, Satoshi and Tomonaga, Masaki and Call, Josep}
}

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