Is (Un)Countabilism Restrictive?

dc.contributor.authorBarton, Neil
dc.date.accessioned2026-01-28T13:12:44Z
dc.date.available2026-01-28T13:12:44Z
dc.date.issued2025
dc.description.abstractLet’s suppose you think that there are no uncountable sets. Have you adopted a restrictive position? It is certainly tempting to say yes—you’ve prohibited the existence of certain kinds of large set. This paper argues that this intuition can be challenged. Instead, I argue that a formal notion of restrictiveness suggests that it is restrictive to hold that there are uncountable sets.
dc.description.versionpublisheddeu
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10992-025-09812-8
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/75966
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subject.ddc100
dc.titleIs (Un)Countabilism Restrictive?eng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLE
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@article{Barton2025UnCou-75966,
  title={Is (Un)Countabilism Restrictive?},
  year={2025},
  doi={10.1007/s10992-025-09812-8},
  volume={54},
  issn={0022-3611},
  journal={Journal of Philosophical Logic},
  pages={1061--1077},
  author={Barton, Neil}
}
kops.citation.iso690BARTON, Neil, 2025. Is (Un)Countabilism Restrictive?. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic. Springer. 2025, 54, S. 1061-1077. ISSN 0022-3611. eISSN 1573-0433. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1007/s10992-025-09812-8deu
kops.citation.iso690BARTON, Neil, 2025. Is (Un)Countabilism Restrictive?. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic. Springer. 2025, 54, pp. 1061-1077. ISSN 0022-3611. eISSN 1573-0433. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s10992-025-09812-8eng
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kops.relation.uniknProjectTitleForcing: Conceptual Change in the Foundations of Mathematics
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kops.sourcefield.plainJournal of Philosophical Logic. Springer. 2025, 54, pp. 1061-1077. ISSN 0022-3611. eISSN 1573-0433. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s10992-025-09812-8eng
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