Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief

Raidl, Eric; Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels

Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief

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Datum

2017

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Journal of Philosophical Logic. 2017, 46(6), pp. 577-609. ISSN 0022-3611. eISSN 1573-0433. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s10992-016-9411-0

Zusammenfassung

In this paper we compare Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief (Leitgeb, 2013, 2014) and Spohn’s ranking-theoretic account of belief (Spohn, 1988, 2012). We discuss the two theories as solutions to the lottery paradox. To compare the two theories, we introduce a novel translation between ranking (mass) functions and probability (mass) functions. We draw some crucial consequences from this translation, in particular a new probabilistic belief notion. Based on this, we explore the logical relation between the two belief theories, showing that models of Leitgeb’s theory correspond to certain models of Spohn’s theory. The reverse is not true (or holds only under special constraints on the parameter of the translation). Finally, we discuss how these results raise new questions in belief theory. In particular, we raise the question whether stability (a key ingredient of Leitgeb’s theory) is rightly thought of as a property pertaining to belief (rather than to knowledge).

Fachgebiet (DDC)

100 Philosophie

Schlagwörter

Belief, Probability, Lottery paradox, Stability theory, Ranking theory, Knowledge, Lockean thesis, Odds-threshold

Zitieren

ISO 690

RAIDL, Eric, Niels SKOVGAARD-OLSEN, 2017. Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic. 2017, 46(6), pp. 577-609. ISSN 0022-3611. eISSN 1573-0433. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s10992-016-9411-0

BibTex

@article{Raidl2017-12Bridg-41357,
  year={2017},
  doi={10.1007/s10992-016-9411-0},
  title={Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief},
  number={6},
  volume={46},
  issn={0022-3611},
  journal={Journal of Philosophical Logic},
  pages={577--609},
  author={Raidl, Eric and Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja