Student Selection and Incentives

Eisenkopf, Gerald

Student Selection and Incentives

Dateien

TWI_Res_42.pdfGröße: 255.4 KBDownloads: 350

Datum

2009

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

The paper discusses the impact of performance based selection in secondary education on student incentives. The theoretical approach combines human capital theory with signaling theory. The consideration of signaling offers an explanation for observed performance of educational systems with a standard peer effect argument. More specifically it can be optimal to select students according to ability even if selective systems do not outperform comprehensive systems in tests. Selection achieves the same output with lower private costs for the students. The paper questions the strong focus on educational tests to measure the efficiency of selective systems as long as these tests provide no information about a student s incentives and private costs.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Education, signalling, selection, ability grouping, incentives

Zitieren

ISO 690

EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2009. Student Selection and Incentives

BibTex

@techreport{Eisenkopf2009Stude-11936,
  year={2009},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Student Selection and Incentives},
  number={42},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja