Student Selection and Incentives

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2009
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The paper discusses the impact of performance based selection in secondary education on student incentives. The theoretical approach combines human capital theory with signaling theory. The consideration of signaling offers an explanation for observed performance of educational systems with a standard peer effect argument. More specifically it can be optimal to select students according to ability even if selective systems do not outperform comprehensive systems in tests. Selection achieves the same output with lower private costs for the students. The paper questions the strong focus on educational tests to measure the efficiency of selective systems as long as these tests provide no information about a student s incentives and private costs.

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330 Wirtschaft
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Education, signalling, selection, ability grouping, incentives
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ISO 690EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2009. Student Selection and Incentives
BibTex
@techreport{Eisenkopf2009Stude-11936,
  year={2009},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Student Selection and Incentives},
  number={42},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald}
}
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