On the drawbacks of large committees

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2017
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International Journal of Game Theory. 2017, 46(2), pp. 563-582. ISSN 0020-7276. eISSN 1432-1270. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00182-016-0546-6
Zusammenfassung

This paper aims at identifying possible drawbacks of large committees. I present a model of a committee of experts with career concerns where each expert may observe an argument about the state of the world but be unsure about the argument’s soundness. Experts may remain silent or decide to be the first to announce an argument. In contrast with the existing literature, I focus on the possibility that experts may discover duplicate information. I show that experts become more reluctant to speak in larger committees as a result. This effect can be sufficiently strong to make small groups of experts optimal.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Experts, Committees, Career concerns, Verifiable information
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ISO 690HAHN, Volker, 2017. On the drawbacks of large committees. In: International Journal of Game Theory. 2017, 46(2), pp. 563-582. ISSN 0020-7276. eISSN 1432-1270. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00182-016-0546-6
BibTex
@article{Hahn2017-05drawb-39110,
  year={2017},
  doi={10.1007/s00182-016-0546-6},
  title={On the drawbacks of large committees},
  number={2},
  volume={46},
  issn={0020-7276},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  pages={563--582},
  author={Hahn, Volker}
}
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