Crossing the Point of No Return : A Public Goods Experiment

Fischbacher, Urs; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria

Crossing the Point of No Return : A Public Goods Experiment

Dateien

TWI-RPS-072-Fischbacher-Gueth-Levati-2011-12.pdfGröße: 1.68 MBDownloads: 205

Datum

2011

Autor:innen

Fischbacher, Urs

Güth, Werner

Levati, M. Vittoria

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

Participants in a public goods experiment receive private or common signals regarding the so-called "point of no return", meaning that if the group’s total contribution falls below this point, all payoffs are reduced. An individual faces the usual conflict between private and collective interests above the point of no return, while he incurs the risk of damaging everyone by not surpassing the point. Our data reveal that contributions are higher if the cost of not reaching the threshold is high. In particular if the signal is private, many subjects are not willing to provide the necessary contribution.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Public goods, provision point mechanism, experiments, reduction factor, signal

Zitieren

ISO 690

FISCHBACHER, Urs, Werner GÜTH, M. Vittoria LEVATI, 2011. Crossing the Point of No Return : A Public Goods Experiment

BibTex

@techreport{Fischbacher2011Cross-17675,
  year={2011},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Crossing the Point of No Return : A Public Goods Experiment},
  number={72},
  author={Fischbacher, Urs and Güth, Werner and Levati, M. Vittoria}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja