The Realism/Antirealism Debate in the Philosophy of Science

Abstract

This is a defense of the doctrine of scientific realism (SR). SR is defined throughthe following two claims:(i) Most essential unobservables posited by the well-established current scientifictheories exist independently of our minds.(ii) We know our well-established scientific theories to be approximately true.I first offer positive argumentation for SR. I begin with theso-called 'success arguments' for SR: 1) scientifictheories most of the times entail successful predictions; 2) science ismethodologically successful in generating empirically successful theories.SR explains these facts via inference to the best explanation (IBE).I combine Hacking's experimental argument for entity realism withSalmon's common-cause principle. I take entity realism to be foundationalto SR: one may believe in the existenceof some theoretical entities without believing in any particular theory in which these areembedded. Its motivation comes from experimental practice, where the manipulation ofthese entities often relies on incompatible theoretical accounts.The underdetermination (UD) topic is thereafter discussed. Several attempts todistinguish between an observable and an unobservable realm are critically discussed,as well as the possibility that for any given theory, there areempirically equivalents generated by means of algorithms. I presentextensive argumentation to the effect that such algorithmic rivals are not to be takenseriously.Social constructivism (SC) is being critically treated. I proceed by distinguishing betweena metaphysical, a semantic, and an epistemic variant of SC. I conclude that only amoderate metaphysical constructivism can stand on its own feet. Its claimis merely that some facts about the world are socially constructed.I finish with a plea for a selective SR, able to do justice to the presenceof both instrumentalism and modest constructivism in scientific practice.