Publikation: The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk
Dateien
Datum
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Link zur Lizenz
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Publikationsstatus
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
This paper develops a stochastic dynamic politico-economic model of sovereign debt to analyze the impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk. We consider a small open economy in which the government has access to official loans conditional on the implementation of austerity policies. There is a two-party system in which both parties care about the population’s welfare but differ in an exogenous utility cost of default. Political turnover is the endogenous outcome of the individual voting behavior. In a quantitative application to the Greek economy, we find that bailouts amplify political turnover risk, which, in turn, elevates sovereign interest spreads. While stricter conditionality fosters the probability of political turnover and sovereign default in the short run, it may mitigate political turnover and default risk in the long run. The frequency of political turnover is U-shaped in the strength of conditionality.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
Zitieren
ISO 690
PREIN, Timm M., Almuth SCHOLL, 2021. The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. Elsevier. 2021, 124, 104065. ISSN 0165-1889. eISSN 1879-1743. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2020.104065BibTex
@article{Prein2021impac-52551, year={2021}, doi={10.1016/j.jedc.2020.104065}, title={The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk}, volume={124}, issn={0165-1889}, journal={Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, author={Prein, Timm M. and Scholl, Almuth}, note={Article Number: 104065} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/52551"> <dcterms:issued>2021</dcterms:issued> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2021-01-25T15:26:15Z</dc:date> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/52551/1/Prein_2-z7g5g9o108y52.PDF"/> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/52551/1/Prein_2-z7g5g9o108y52.PDF"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dc:creator>Prein, Timm M.</dc:creator> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:contributor>Prein, Timm M.</dc:contributor> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2021-01-25T15:26:15Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43613"/> <dcterms:title>The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk</dcterms:title> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43613"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/52551"/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> <dc:contributor>Scholl, Almuth</dc:contributor> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper develops a stochastic dynamic politico-economic model of sovereign debt to analyze the impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk. We consider a small open economy in which the government has access to official loans conditional on the implementation of austerity policies. There is a two-party system in which both parties care about the population’s welfare but differ in an exogenous utility cost of default. Political turnover is the endogenous outcome of the individual voting behavior. In a quantitative application to the Greek economy, we find that bailouts amplify political turnover risk, which, in turn, elevates sovereign interest spreads. While stricter conditionality fosters the probability of political turnover and sovereign default in the short run, it may mitigate political turnover and default risk in the long run. The frequency of political turnover is U-shaped in the strength of conditionality.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:creator>Scholl, Almuth</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>