Policy-making in an electoral autocracy : constitutional reform in Togo

Abstract

The literature on electoral authoritarianism has only recently begun discussing the determinants of policy-making – namely to what extent these regimes can be representative of, or responsive to, their citizens (cf. Truex 2016) or pursue redistributive policies (cf. Albertus 2015). This chapter contributes to the debate by examining the case of Togo. Under Gnassingbé Eyadéma, Togo was one of Africa’s most oppressive dictatorships, with policies aimed at maintaining the regime’s stability. Patronage was given to pro-regime elements (e.g., the president’s ethnic group, the military, and sections of the business and administrative elite), and there were strong elements of personalist rule. A limited opening in the 1990s re-introduced multiparty elections, but power remained in the hands of the incumbent party. Following Eyadéma’s death in 2005, the army installed his son, Faure Gnassingbé, who had to adapt policy-making styles to guarantee the regime’s survival. Using data from extensive fieldwork in 2014 and 2015, this chapter traces recent shifts in the ruling elite coalition and the resulting changes in national policy-making. While there are many continuities with the past, ruling elites have become slightly more inclusive and the distribution of patronage is increasingly affected by electoral politics and election outcomes.