The electoral politics of welfare state reforms

Abstract

The ‘new politics’ framework outlined by Pierson and others contains hypotheses concerning electoral competition and welfare reforms. Central claims are that reforms entailing welfare retrenchment are highly unpopular with voters. Consequently, policymakers either shy away from retrenchment or use various blame avoidance strategies to avert electoral punishment. In this chapter, we start with the state of knowledge around 2000 and then turn to the main empirical advances since then. Starting from the surprising finding that welfare state changes may have no systematic electoral consequences, we turn to the underlying causal mechanisms. In this context, we take a closer look at voter preferences, discussing advances in our theoretical and empirical knowledge on the politics of blame avoidance. In conclusion, we highlight blind spots in the literature, such as the politics of systemic retrenchment, and discuss future avenues for research in light of new developments affecting welfare politics, such as the climate crisis and the rise of the radical right.