Publikation: Rationalizing : Kant on Moral Self-Deception
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Kant’s moral philosophy is challenged by the so-called “Socratic Paradox”: If free will and pure practical reason are to be identified, as Kant argues, then there seems to be no room for immoral actions that are to be imputed to our individual freedom. The paper argues that Kant’s conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”) helps us to avoid the Socratic Paradox, and to understand how immoral actions can be imputed to our individual freedom and responsibility. In rationalizing, we misuse our capacity of reason in order to construct the illusion according to which we are not bound to the absolute demand of the moral law, but rather subject to exceptions and excuses. Finally, the paper interprets the three rules of “common sense” (sensus communis) in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment in terms of an antidote to rationalizing.
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NOLLER, Jörg, 2022. Rationalizing : Kant on Moral Self-Deception. In: SATS : Northern European Journal of Philosophy. De Gruyter. 2022, 23(2), pp. 175-189. ISSN 1600-1974. eISSN 1869-7577. Available under: doi: 10.1515/sats-2020-0011BibTex
@article{Noller2022Ratio-58186, year={2022}, doi={10.1515/sats-2020-0011}, title={Rationalizing : Kant on Moral Self-Deception}, number={2}, volume={23}, issn={1600-1974}, journal={SATS : Northern European Journal of Philosophy}, pages={175--189}, author={Noller, Jörg} }
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