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Committees and reciprocity

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2009

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Mühe, Felix

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-246477
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.10.001
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Mathematical Social Sciences. 2009, 57(1), pp. 26-47. ISSN 0165-4896. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.10.001

Zusammenfassung

In this paper we examine the impact of reciprocal motives on decision-making in a committee. We show that each strategy profile that constitutes an equilibrium without reciprocity also represents an equilibrium under reciprocity. Under reciprocity, additional equilibria may exist. All of them imply lower material payoffs and lower overall utility for a large majority of members compared to equilibria that also represent equilibria without reciprocity. We discuss mechanisms such as incentive contracts that may eliminate the negative effects of reciprocity. In a dynamic framework we show that “psychological logrolling equilibria” may exist, where some agents perceive others as kind and therefore accept projects that are detrimental to themselves but beneficial to others.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Reciprocity, Committees, Logrolling, Voting

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ISO 690HAHN, Volker, Felix MÜHE, 2009. Committees and reciprocity. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. 2009, 57(1), pp. 26-47. ISSN 0165-4896. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.10.001
BibTex
@article{Hahn2009Commi-24647,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.10.001},
  title={Committees and reciprocity},
  number={1},
  volume={57},
  issn={0165-4896},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
  pages={26--47},
  author={Hahn, Volker and Mühe, Felix}
}
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