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Why agents need discretion : the business judgement rule as optimal standard of care

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2017

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Engert, Andreas

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Review of Law & Economics. 2017, 13(1), 20150033. ISSN 1555-5879. Available under: doi: 10.1515/rle-2015-0033

Zusammenfassung

Should managers be liable for ill-conceived business decisions? One answer is given by U.S. courts, which almost never hold managers liable for their mistakes. In this paper, we address the question in a theoretical model of delegated decision making. We find that courts should indeed be lenient as long as contracts are restricted to be linear. With more general compensation schemes, the answer depends on the precision of the court’s signal. If courts make many mistakes in evaluating decisions, they should not impose liability for poor business judgment.

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330 Wirtschaft

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business judgment rule; manager liability; delegated decision-making

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ISO 690ENGERT, Andreas, Susanne GOLDLÜCKE, 2017. Why agents need discretion : the business judgement rule as optimal standard of care. In: Review of Law & Economics. 2017, 13(1), 20150033. ISSN 1555-5879. Available under: doi: 10.1515/rle-2015-0033
BibTex
@article{Engert2017agent-28591,
  year={2017},
  doi={10.1515/rle-2015-0033},
  title={Why agents need discretion : the business judgement rule as optimal standard of care},
  number={1},
  volume={13},
  issn={1555-5879},
  journal={Review of Law & Economics},
  author={Engert, Andreas and Goldlücke, Susanne},
  note={Article Number: 20150033}
}
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