The Profit of Morality : On the Attempt to Reconcile Morality and Well-Being

Abstract

In The Profit of Morality, I take a look at the so-called reconciliation project between morality and well-being. The goal of this project is to show that we are better off by being moral than by being immoral. My PhD thesis deals with the reconciliation project in three ways and is thus divided into three parts. In Part I, I am concerned with rebutting an objection against the core idea of the project. According to this objection, being moral is grounded in well-being and utility calculations even though being moral precludes utility calculations. But I reject this objection as a misinterpretation of the intention of the project. In Part II, I discuss three variants of a reconciliation in light of their prospects of success. Specifically, it is analyzed how classical and contemporary authors tried to show in different theories of well-being that we reach more pleasure, more desire satisfaction, or realize more of our human potential by being moral than by being immoral. But I conclude that every theory of well-being has to be modified implausibly in order to achieve the goal of the project. In Part III, I develop a different approach in the reconciliation project. The idea is that well-being can neither be attained by maximizing the satisfaction of one’s appetites nor by minimizing one’s appetites because the maximizer and the minimizer are prone to become a restless, discontented Sisyphus. Rather, well-being is in a mean between these extremes. I argue then that the vices of intemperance and injustice incite us to maximize, while the virtues of temperance and justice guide us to the mean. We are thus better off by being moral than by being immoral because the virtues prevent us from becoming a restless, discontented Sisyphus and therein lies the profit of morality.