Coercion and Hierarchy : How Asymmetric Alliances Shape Sanctions Policy Across Institutional Contexts

Abstract

This dissertation explores how hierarchical relationships among states shape coercion patterns in international politics. It challenges the traditional assumption of an anarchic system where all states operate as sovereign equals. Instead, I argue that many international orders structure themselves around Hierarchy (Lake 2011, 2024). In these relationships, less powerful states voluntarily cede parts of their sovereignty to a dominant state in return for security guarantees. These asymmetric alliances significantly influence both the decision to impose sanctions and their likelihood of success. I develop a two-dimensional Hierarchy-Coercion-Framework that distinguishes between anarchic and hierarchical orders and between coercion inside or outside intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In anarchic systems, sanctions are more likely to be unilateral or reflect weak, ad hoc coalitions, whether inside or outside IGOs. Conversely, hierarchical orders produce strong, coordinated sanctions and may represent themselves as an IGO. The empirical analysis covers three chapters. The first examines how the United States, as the post-Cold War central power, uses its position to impose two sanction types: alliance-strengthening, norms-based sanctions that reflect shared liberal-democratic values, and unilateral "bullying" sanctions driven by domestic or strategic interests. The findings suggest that formal alliances decrease the success of bullying sanctions due to political and security costs. Sanctions are most effective when they enforce shared norms within such hierarchies, for example, when a democratic ally backslides on commitments. These sanctions are multilateral, supported by the entire alliance, and reflect a collective interest. The second empirical chapter focuses on extraterritorial sanctions as an aggressive form of bullying. The highly unequal economic networks created by hierarchy allow a powerful state to abuse its power to bully allies and others, risking the loss of the hierarchical relationship. I argue that extraterritorial sanctions are a key instrument through which the powerful sender uses control over allies' economies to coerce a target state. Using the 2018 reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran as a natural experiment, the author employs a difference-in-differences design to measure the effects on third countries. The analysis shows that U.S. allies, especially those deeply embedded in the hierarchical economic and financial networks, suffered the most significant economic costs, even though they vocally opposed the sanctions. The third empirical chapter shifts focus to IGOs. I argue that IGOs only impose forceful sanctions effectively when they reflect underlying hierarchical relationships among their members. I identify three necessary conditions for an IGO to qualify: asymmetric power distributions, the transfer of security authority from weaker to stronger states, and the presence of veto rights that institutionalize the voluntary nature of the Hierarchy. Indeed, among all sanctioning IGOs from 1990 to 2018, only the five permanent members of the UNSC and European Union member states possessed these relationships. Consequently, only they were consistently able to impose forceful sanctions, unlike members of the African Union, ECOWAS, and the broader UN. Member states in these organizations were significantly less likely to bust the sanctions, which reinforces the idea that Hierarchy ensures effective sanctions. The concluding chapter synthesizes these findings to argue that Hierarchy is a critical but overlooked factor in understanding the use of economic sanctions. The work emphasizes that hierarchies are fragile and contingent: when the dominant power abuses its position, such as by imposing self-interested sanctions against allies, it risks dismantling the very structure that enables its influence. Subordinate states can choose to exit the relationship and reclaim sovereignty. Policy implications are significant. First, powerful states must carefully balance bullying behavior with maintaining Hierarchy. Second, the created economic networks are politically constructed and can unravel. Third, IGOs should allow for hierarchical relationships if they intend to enforce sanctions effectively. This suggests that veto rights—often viewed as a barrier—may in fact be essential for enabling strong, enforceable decisions in institutions like the UN or the EU. Rather than removing vetoes to increase sanction frequency, states might fare better by forming coalitions outside IGOs when their preferences diverge. The dissertation concludes by outlining future research avenues, including extending the framework to non-democratic coalitions, studying hierarchy breakdowns, and exploring how economic inducements sustain hierarchical orders. Overall, the dissertation makes a significant contribution by showing that international coercion cannot be fully understood without taking Hierarchy seriously.