Publikation: Levity
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2009
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Mind : A Quarterly Review of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 2009, 118(471), pp. 555-581. ISSN 0026-4423. eISSN 1460-2113. Available under: doi: 10.1093/mind/fzp096
Zusammenfassung
In this article, the prospects of deflationism about the concept of truth are investigated. A new version of deflationism, called inferential deflationism, is articulated and defended. It is argued that it avoids the pitfalls of earlier deflationist views such as Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth and Field’s version of deflationism.
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100 Philosophie
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HORSTEN, Leon, 2009. Levity. In: Mind : A Quarterly Review of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 2009, 118(471), pp. 555-581. ISSN 0026-4423. eISSN 1460-2113. Available under: doi: 10.1093/mind/fzp096BibTex
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title={Levity},
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pages={555--581},
author={Horsten, Leon}
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