The neural basis of belief updating and rational decision making

Achtziger, Anja; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Hügelschäfer, Sabine; Steinhauser, Marco

The neural basis of belief updating and rational decision making

Files

Achtziger_0-269440.pdf(262.66 KB)

Date

2014

Publication type

Journal article

Published in

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience ; 9 (2014), 1. - pp. 55-62. - ISSN 1749-5016. - eISSN 1749-5024

Abstract

Rational decision making under uncertainty requires forming beliefs that integrate prior and new information through Bayes’ rule. Human decision makers typically deviate from Bayesian updating by either overweighting the prior (conservatism) or overweighting new information (e.g. the representativeness heuristic). We investigated these deviations through measurements of electrocortical activity in the human brain during incentivized probability-updating tasks and found evidence of extremely early commitment to boundedly rational heuristics. Participants who overweight new information display a lower sensibility to conflict detection, captured by an event-related potential (the N2) observed around 260 ms after the presentation of new information. Conservative decision makers (who overweight prior probabilities) make up their mind before new information is presented, as indicated by the lateralized readiness potential in the brain. That is, they do not inhibit the processing of new information but rather immediately rely on the prior for making a decision.

Subject (DDC)

150 Psychology

Keywords

Bayesian updating, conservatism, representativeness heuristic, LRP, N2

Cite This

ISO 690

ACHTZIGER, Anja, Carlos ALÓS-FERRER, Sabine HÜGELSCHÄFER, Marco STEINHAUSER, 2014. The neural basis of belief updating and rational decision making. In: Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. 9(1), pp. 55-62. ISSN 1749-5016. eISSN 1749-5024. Available under: doi: 10.1093/scan/nss099

BibTex

@article{Achtziger2014neura-30430,
  year={2014},
  doi={10.1093/scan/nss099},
  title={The neural basis of belief updating and rational decision making},
  number={1},
  volume={9},
  issn={1749-5016},
  journal={Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience},
  pages={55--62},
  author={Achtziger, Anja and Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Hügelschäfer, Sabine and Steinhauser, Marco}
}

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