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On the Evasion of Employment Protection Legislation

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2012

Autor:innen

Baumann, Florian

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-177916
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2011.06.005
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Labour Economics. 2012, 19(1), pp. 9-17. ISSN 0927-5371. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2011.06.005

Zusammenfassung

This paper analyzes how the option to evade employment protection legislation impacts on unemployment. Using a stylized model, it is established that the level of unemployment is non-monotonous in the degree of strictness with which employment protection legislation is enforced. Considering just cause and social criteria requirements for three regulatory regimes representative of a large number of industrialized countries, we find that different regimes generate different dismissal decisions only if the regimes are strictly enforced. In contrast, unemployment rates may differ across regimes even in the case of weak enforcement. Additionally, we find that it may be worse for the economy to weakly enforce harmful regulations than to strictly enforce them.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Evasion, Employment protection, Dismissal regulations, Heterogeneous workers

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ISO 690BAUMANN, Florian, Tim FRIEHE, 2012. On the Evasion of Employment Protection Legislation. In: Labour Economics. 2012, 19(1), pp. 9-17. ISSN 0927-5371. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2011.06.005
BibTex
@article{Baumann2012Evasi-17791,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.labeco.2011.06.005},
  title={On the Evasion of Employment Protection Legislation},
  number={1},
  volume={19},
  issn={0927-5371},
  journal={Labour Economics},
  pages={9--17},
  author={Baumann, Florian and Friehe, Tim}
}
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