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A Note on the Optimality of (Even More) Incomplete Strict Liability

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2011

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Baumann, Florian
Grechenig, Kristoffel

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International Review of Law and Economics. 2011, 31(2), pp. 77-82. ISSN 0144-8188. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2011.01.004

Zusammenfassung

This paper starts from the premise that liability is incomplete and establishes that firms may nevertheless invest excessively in care. This may justify a (further) reduction in the level of liability from a social standpoint, thereby arguing against seeking to approach full compensation as close as possible. In our framework, firms are liable under product liability, but also invest in care to prevent consumers’ switching to competitors. Affecting the partition of consumers by means of care-taking is not desirable from a social standpoint. Consequently, it may be optimal to reduce liability below a given level of incomplete compensation in order to adjust firms’ care incentives.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

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Tort law, Product liability, Care level, Incomplete compensation, Market forces

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ISO 690BAUMANN, Florian, Tim FRIEHE, Kristoffel GRECHENIG, 2011. A Note on the Optimality of (Even More) Incomplete Strict Liability. In: International Review of Law and Economics. 2011, 31(2), pp. 77-82. ISSN 0144-8188. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2011.01.004
BibTex
@article{Baumann2011Optim-17786,
  year={2011},
  doi={10.1016/j.irle.2011.01.004},
  title={A Note on the Optimality of (Even More) Incomplete Strict Liability},
  number={2},
  volume={31},
  issn={0144-8188},
  journal={International Review of Law and Economics},
  pages={77--82},
  author={Baumann, Florian and Friehe, Tim and Grechenig, Kristoffel}
}
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