Publikation: Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts : An Experiment
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We examine the incentive e ffects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial eff ort decisions and allocative e ciency. We experiment with four types of contracts (standard debt contract, outside equity, non-monotonic contract, full-subsidy contract) that di er in the structure of investor repayment and, therefore, in the incentives for entrepreneurial e ffort provision. Theoretically the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contract reduces eff ort distortions and increases e ciency. We test this non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis in the laboratory as well.
Our results reveal that the incentive e ffects of funding contracts need to be
experienced before they refl ect in observed behavior. With su cient experience
observed behavior is consistent with the theoretical predictions and supports the non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis: we fi nd that the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-neutral non-monotonic contract increases entrepreneurial income by 170% and total surplus by 30% in our setting.
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REISS, J. Philipp, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2011. Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts : An ExperimentBibTex
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year={2011},
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title={Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts : An Experiment},
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author={Reiss, J. Philipp and Wolff, Irenaeus}
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<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We examine the incentive e ffects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial eff ort decisions and allocative e ciency. We experiment with four types of contracts (standard debt contract, outside equity, non-monotonic contract, full-subsidy contract) that di er in the structure of investor repayment and, therefore, in the incentives for entrepreneurial e ffort provision. Theoretically the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contract reduces eff ort distortions and increases e ciency. We test this non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis in the laboratory as well.<br />Our results reveal that the incentive e ffects of funding contracts need to be<br />experienced before they refl ect in observed behavior. With su cient experience<br />observed behavior is consistent with the theoretical predictions and supports the non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis: we fi nd that the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-neutral non-monotonic contract increases entrepreneurial income by 170% and total surplus by 30% in our setting.</dcterms:abstract>
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