Publikation: Do Elections Matter for Economic Performance?
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2015
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Collier, Paul
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Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 2015, 77(1), pp. 1-21. ISSN 0305-9049. eISSN 0305-9049. Available under: doi: 10.1111/obes.12054
Zusammenfassung
In mature democracies, elections discipline leaders to deliver good economic performance.Since the fall of the Soviet Union, most developing countries also hold elections, but theseare often marred by illicit tactics. Using a new global data set, this article investigateswhether these illicit tactics are merely blemishes or substantially undermine the economicefficacy of elections. We show that illicit tactics are widespread, and that they reducethe incentive for governments to deliver good economic performance. Our analysis alsosuggests that in societies with regular free and fair elections, leaders do not matter foreconomic growth.
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320 Politik
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COLLIER, Paul, Anke HOEFFLER, 2015. Do Elections Matter for Economic Performance?. In: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 2015, 77(1), pp. 1-21. ISSN 0305-9049. eISSN 0305-9049. Available under: doi: 10.1111/obes.12054BibTex
@article{Collier2015-02Elect-45527,
year={2015},
doi={10.1111/obes.12054},
title={Do Elections Matter for Economic Performance?},
number={1},
volume={77},
issn={0305-9049},
journal={Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics},
pages={1--21},
author={Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke}
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