Publikation:

Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information

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Baumann.pdf
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Datum

2010

Autor:innen

Baumann, Florian

Herausgeber:innen

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ISBN

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URI (zitierfähiger Link)
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-126824
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0123-6
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Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green

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Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
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Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

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Published

Erschienen in

Journal of Economics. 2010, 100(1), pp. 19-32. ISSN 0931-8658. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00712-010-0123-6

Zusammenfassung

This paper analyzes a two-period setup in which firms differ with respect to costs of care and may use care-taking to signal type to consumers, who are able to observe precaution taken only ex post. Applying the refinement of the intuitive criterion to the concept of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we establish a unique separating equilibrium for every share of harm borne by firms. For low levels of victim compensation, we show that (i) firms choose weakly higher care in a setting in which customers do not know the firms’ type than in a setting in which they do, and (ii) the deviation in precaution taken due to asymmetric information on firm type is welfare-improving.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Tort law, product liability, signaling, care level, asymmetric information

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ISO 690BAUMANN, Florian, Tim FRIEHE, 2010. Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information. In: Journal of Economics. 2010, 100(1), pp. 19-32. ISSN 0931-8658. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00712-010-0123-6
BibTex
@article{Baumann2010Produ-12682,
  year={2010},
  doi={10.1007/s00712-010-0123-6},
  title={Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information},
  number={1},
  volume={100},
  issn={0931-8658},
  journal={Journal of Economics},
  pages={19--32},
  author={Baumann, Florian and Friehe, Tim}
}
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