Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers

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2012
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Kranz, Sebastian
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Journal of Economic Theory. 2012, 147(3), pp. 1191-1221. ISSN 0022-0531. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008
Zusammenfassung

This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Repeated games, Computational methods, Monetary transfers, Imperfect public monitoring
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ISO 690GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2012. Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2012, 147(3), pp. 1191-1221. ISSN 0022-0531. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008
BibTex
@article{Goldlucke2012Infin-28567,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008},
  title={Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers},
  number={3},
  volume={147},
  issn={0022-0531},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
  pages={1191--1221},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
}
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