Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers

Goldlücke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian

Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers

Dateien

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Datum

2012

Autor:innen

Goldlücke, Susanne

Kranz, Sebastian

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

unikn.publication.listelement.citation.prefix.version.undefined

Journal of Economic Theory. 2012, 147(3), pp. 1191-1221. ISSN 0022-0531. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008

Zusammenfassung

This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Repeated games, Computational methods, Monetary transfers, Imperfect public monitoring

Zitieren

ISO 690

GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2012. Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2012, 147(3), pp. 1191-1221. ISSN 0022-0531. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008

BibTex

@article{Goldlucke2012Infin-28567,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008},
  title={Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers},
  number={3},
  volume={147},
  issn={0022-0531},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
  pages={1191--1221},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
}

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