Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers

Goldlücke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian

Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2018

Autor:innen

Goldlücke, Susanne

Kranz, Sebastian

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1060-1

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Economic Theory. 2018, 66(1), pp. 235-263. ISSN 0938-2259. eISSN 1432-0479. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-017-1060-1

Zusammenfassung

This paper studies discounted stochastic games with perfect or imperfect public monitoring and the opportunity to conduct voluntary monetary transfers and possibly burn money. This generalization of repeated games with transfers is ideally suited to study relational contracting in applications with long-term investments and also allows to study collusive industry dynamics. We show that for all discount factors every perfect public equilibrium payoff can be implemented with a class of simple equilibria that have a stationary structure on the equilibrium path and optimal penal codes with a stick-and-carrot structure. We develop an algorithm for perfect monitoring to compute the set of equilibrium payoffs and find simple equilibria that implement these payoffs.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Dynamic games, Relational contracting, Monetary transfers, Computation, Imperfect public monitoring, Perfect public equilibria

Zitieren

ISO 690

GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2018. Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers. In: Economic Theory. 2018, 66(1), pp. 235-263. ISSN 0938-2259. eISSN 1432-0479. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-017-1060-1

BibTex

@article{Goldlucke2018-07Disco-39837,
  year={2018},
  doi={10.1007/s00199-017-1060-1},
  title={Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers},
  number={1},
  volume={66},
  issn={0938-2259},
  journal={Economic Theory},
  pages={235--263},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
}

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