Publikation: Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes
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Why do authoritarian governments exclude ethnic groups if this jeopardizes their regime survival? We generalize existing arguments that attribute exclusion dynamics to ethnic coalition formation. We argue that a mutual commitment problem, between the ethnic ruling group and potential coalition members, leads to power-balanced ethnic coalitions. However, authoritarian regimes with institutions that mitigate credible commitment problems facilitate the formation of coalitions that are less balanced in power. We test our arguments with a k-adic conditional logit approach, using data on ethnic groups and their power status. We demonstrate that in autocracies, the ruling ethnic group is more likely to form and maintain coalitions that balance population sizes among all coalition members. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the extent to which balancing occurs is conditional on authoritarian regime type.
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BEISER, Janina, Nils W. METTERNICH, 2021. Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes. In: Comparative Political Studies. Sage. 2021, 54(1), pp. 144-178. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414020920656BibTex
@article{Beiser2021-01Ethni-50399, year={2021}, doi={10.1177/0010414020920656}, title={Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes}, number={1}, volume={54}, issn={0010-4140}, journal={Comparative Political Studies}, pages={144--178}, author={Beiser, Janina and Metternich, Nils W.} }
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