Publikation: Financing Unemployment Benefits : Dismissal versus Employment Taxes
Lade...
Dateien
Datum
2005
Autor:innen
Baumann, Florian
Stähler, Nikolai
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Link zur Lizenz
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Sammlungen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Working Paper/Technical Report
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
This paper investigates the effects of using dismissal taxes to finance unemployment benefits. We compare dismissal and employment taxes in a model with search frictions. Employment taxes give rise to externalities because firms do not take into account the effects their dismissal decisions have on others. By introducing dismissal taxes to finance unemployment insurance, these externalities can partly be internalized. Taking into account the budget of the unemployment insurance, employment taxes can be reduced by more than necessary to offset the adverse effect of dismissal taxes on the firm value. The introduction of dismissal taxes leads to higher job creation and lower unemployment, in contrast to standard results concerning employment protection.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Such- und Matching-Modelle, employment protection, search and matching models, unemployment, unemployment insurance
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690
BAUMANN, Florian, Nikolai STÄHLER, 2005. Financing Unemployment Benefits : Dismissal versus Employment TaxesBibTex
@techreport{Baumann2005Finan-11765,
year={2005},
series={Diskussionspapiere der DFG-Forschergruppe Heterogene Arbeit},
title={Financing Unemployment Benefits : Dismissal versus Employment Taxes},
number={05/03},
author={Baumann, Florian and Stähler, Nikolai}
}RDF
<rdf:RDF
xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/11765">
<void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
<dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
<dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
<dcterms:issued>2005</dcterms:issued>
<dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:40:06Z</dc:date>
<dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/11765/1/HeterogeneArbeit_0503.pdf"/>
<dcterms:title>Financing Unemployment Benefits : Dismissal versus Employment Taxes</dcterms:title>
<dc:creator>Stähler, Nikolai</dc:creator>
<dc:contributor>Stähler, Nikolai</dc:contributor>
<foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
<dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
<dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/11765/1/HeterogeneArbeit_0503.pdf"/>
<dc:creator>Baumann, Florian</dc:creator>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper investigates the effects of using dismissal taxes to finance unemployment benefits. We compare dismissal and employment taxes in a model with search frictions. Employment taxes give rise to externalities because firms do not take into account the effects their dismissal decisions have on others. By introducing dismissal taxes to finance unemployment insurance, these externalities can partly be internalized. Taking into account the budget of the unemployment insurance, employment taxes can be reduced by more than necessary to offset the adverse effect of dismissal taxes on the firm value. The introduction of dismissal taxes leads to higher job creation and lower unemployment, in contrast to standard results concerning employment protection.</dcterms:abstract>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<dc:contributor>Baumann, Florian</dc:contributor>
<dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:40:06Z</dcterms:available>
<bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11765"/>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
